Q&A: Just how risky is the Iran attack gamble?

2026-03-02 - 16:07

Why have the US and Israel chosen now as the right time to launch this war against Iran? The Trump administration and the Netanyahu government have certainly embarked on a war of choice. There is no substantive evidence that Iran was prepared to attack either the US or Israel. There are geopolitical and domestic political reasons why US President Donald Trump launched an assault against Iran at this time. Trump struck Iran largely because his team apparently perceived that the clerical regime in Tehran was vulnerable following widespread domestic protests in the country, providing an opportunity for the US to topple Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard after 47 years of episodic confrontations between the two nations. At the same time, with the mid-term elections in November 2026, Trump finds himself facing a number of negative political trends at home. Trump’s tariffs have increased the cost of living for many Americans; the delayed release of the Epstein files by the US Department of Justice has not quelled the debate over Trump’s relationship with Jeffrey Epstein; and Trump’s approval ratings in opinion polls have dramatically slumped. In essence, Trump’s decision to launch a joint military operation with Israel against Iran reflected the conviction he could successfully emasculate the regime in Tehran and thus change a narrative around the administration’s declining position in the US. How strategically risky is it for Iran to have attacked/tried to attack Saudi Arabia, and each of the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain, given they’d been publicly counselling against a US attack. Do the Iranian attacks isolate it precariously? It is a risk for Iran to retaliate against many of its neighbours that, with the possible exception of Saudi Arabia, have declined to support the US/Israel attack. However, while such a move risks diplomatic isolation, Tehran may believe that such retaliation brings home to neighbouring states that providing strategic facilities to the Trump administration is not cost-free and can have adverse consequences for the states in question. What are the scenarios under which the attacks can stop? There are several scenarios in which the attacks could stop. First, what is left of the clerical regime in Tehran collapses and the country enters a political transition. However, this scenario looks unlikely because air strikes alone are unlikely to bring regime change. This outcome would be a win for the US and Israel. Second, the clerical regime demonstrates resilience and defiance and plays the nationalist card to rally a country being attacked by foreign forces. That is to say, incessant air strikes have the unintended effect of reviving the clerical regime, conveying to Washington and Tel Aviv they have little to gain by continuing their aerial bombardment. This outcome would constitute a win for the current regime in Iran. Third, having killed the Supreme Leader and many senior leaders in Tehran, Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may establish a channel of communication with the new leaders in the existing regime and declare that they can now cooperate with the new leadership of the clerical regime in Teheran. This outcome might be interpreted as a draw. Regime change had not been achieved, but Trump and Netanyahu might claim their military intervention achieved a positive transformation in relations with a much weakened clerical government in Iran. What if anything can China do to bolster Iran and preserve its oil access? As Iran’s clerical rulers face one of the biggest threats to their grip on power in years, China has few options – and growing hesitancy – to help its partner. Beijing’s inaction to date reflects the pragmatic nature of their alignment, which is based more on convenience than goodwill or trust. While oil has formed the bedrock of the China-Iran relationship in recent years, China has been preparing for shocks to the oil market for some time and has been stockpiling crude oil since 2024. The bottom line is that if the conflict in Iran continues for a significant period, Beijing is likely to purchase oil from states outside the Middle East. Nevertheless, moving away from buying Iranian oil could pose a few challenges for the Chinese economy during the intervening period. How is the United Nations likely to respond, given this is another apparent breach of the UN charter by the US – and what will that response say about the organisation’s current effectiveness? The UN is only as strong or as weak as its member states allow it to be. Given the US is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security with the power of veto, it’s unlikely it will be held accountable for breaching the UN Charter. What stands out about NZ’s response so far to the bombings, in what we have and haven’t said? For a country that is heavily reliant on an international rules-based order, the New Zealand Government’s statement on the attacks was ambiguous. It acknowledged the actions taken by the US and Israel were “designed to prevent Iran from continuing to threaten international peace and security” and condemned “Iran’s indiscriminate retaliatory attacks on Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan”. Nevertheless, the statement called for “a resumption of negotiation” between the parties – which were broken off without warning by the US – and pleaded for “adherence to international law” without criticising the US and Israel, which had both clearly violated the UN Charter in launching their so-called pre-emptive attacks.